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Agriculture has become a player in world green-
house gas markets by providing carbon credits in 
the form of soil sequestration (crop and rangeland), 
methane capture and forest sequestration. In order to 
provide these carbon credits, agricultural producers 
enter into a contractual arrangement with the market. 
Within the framework of the carbon credit market, soil 
sequestered carbon credits are referred to as exchange 
soil offsets.
The parties involved in soil carbon sequestration 
contracts are the farmer, the aggregator and the market. 
This guide uses the term “farmer” to refer to the per-
son actually providing the carbon offset to the market. 
A nonfarming landowner can also enter into a contract 
to supply carbon offsets as long as he ensures that the 
one farming his land complies with the specifications 
of the contract. Aggregators are businesses that assem-
ble many small providers of soil carbon offsets, then 
register and sell those offsets on the market. Currently 
the major, but not sole, market in the United States is 
the Chicago Climate Exchange. MU Extension publica-
tion G311, An Introduction to Greenhouse Gas Market and 
Cap-and-Trade, summarizes the markets that exist for 
carbon trading in 2009. 
This guide also assumes that farmers will use an 
aggregator to market their carbon credits. While it is 
possible for individual farmers to market their own 
credits, aggregators provide an important service. 
First, the market requires a minimum trade of 12,500 
metric tons of CO2 equivalent (CO2 Eq.) per year. (See 
MU Extension publication G310, Agriculture and Green-
house Gas Emissions, for a more complete description 
of CO2 Eq.) Given that conservation tilled land earns 
0.2 to 1 metric ton CO2 Eq./acre/year in Missouri, this 
minimum trade would require from 12,500 to 62,500 
acres enrolled. The 2007 Census of Agriculture reports 
that there are less than 1,000 farms larger than 2,000 
acres, the largest size reported. Very few, if any, Mis-
souri farmers could participate in the carbon market 
without aggregators pooling the credits of multiple 
farms. Second, aggregators are also able to achieve 
economies of scale associated with verifying and mar-
keting carbon credits.
The contracts offered by aggregators to farmers 
must follow the rules of the Chicago Climate Exchange 
(CCX) for exchange soil offsets (XSOs). Soil carbon 
sequestration contracts offered by AgraGate (created by 
the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation), the North Dakota 
Farmers Union, the National Carbon Offset Coalition, 
Delta P2E2, and Kentucky Corn Growers’ Association 
were consulted to provide information for this guide. 
Web sites that contain their contracts are listed at the 
end of this guide. Other aggregators may also offer soil 
carbon sequestration guides. If soil carbon sequestra-
tion becomes more widespread, other aggregators will 
undoubtedly enter the market.
This guide provides economic and legal insight 
into the contracts used to market soil carbon seques-
tered for the purpose of providing carbon credits. The 
guide is organized around the following key specifica-
tions of carbon sequestration contracts:
Eligible practices•	
Rights to the exchange soil offsets•	
Carbon Reserve Pool•	
Marketing and fees•	
Land tenure changes•	
For each of these topics, this guide evaluates the 
allocation of responsibility, reward and risk among the 
parties involved in the contract. For a more detailed 
explanation of contracts and the responsibility, reward 
and risk analysis, see MU Extension publication G312, 
Contracts in Agriculture. 
Introduction to XSO contracts
Competent legal counsel performs a valuable 
service of protecting an individual’s interest as they 
consider entering into a contractual agreement. Some 
of the clauses of a contract deal with legal concerns 
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not specific to the major intent of the contract. These 
clauses are critical to the efficient functioning of a con-
tract but are not the emphasis of this guide. This guide 
will concentrate on contract clauses that deal with 
the rights and responsibilities of farmers thinking of 
sequestering soil carbon for the purpose of marketing 
carbon credits. 
Three different entities share the decision rights 
associated with carbon sequestration contracts. The 
market (CCX in this case) sets the guidelines for regis-
tering and trading carbon credits. The aggregators are 
responsible for communicating with farmers the spe-
cific rules for carbon sequestration contracts, for reg-
istering the carbon offsets with the CCX, for verifying 
that the practices that earn credits are actually being 
performed, for selling the credits on the CCX market, 
and for financially settling up with the farmers who 
provided the credits. Farmers manage their land in 
such a way as to earn carbon credits that can be deliv-
ered to the market. 
All contracts for carbon credits traded on the Chi-
cago Climate Exchange (CCX) must follow the CCX 
Rulebook. (The Web site that contains the CCX Rule-
book is listed at the end of this guide.) The contracts 
offered by aggregators to farmers reference and sum-
marize the CCX Rulebook but do not present all the 
rules in full detail. While the aggregator is responsible 
for making sure that all participating farmers comply 
with the CCX rules, understanding the underlying 
rules of the CCX is helpful in understanding the rights, 
risks and rewards associated with the contracts. 
Both the farmer and the aggregator bear price and 
financial risk. Price and financial risk occurs for aggre-
gators because they are uncertain of the price at which 
they will sell exchange offsets. With aggregators charg-
ing 8 to 10 percent of the sales for their services, they 
make less money when exchange credits are sold for 
$3 per ton than when they are sold for $7 per ton. In 
addition, the aggregator is ultimately responsible for 
verification expenses, which continue during the life of 
the contract, because a certain percentage of acres must 
be verified to comply with the CCX protocol. While 
the farmer is responsible for paying these fees, until 
sales occur to compensate for these fees, the aggregator 
manages the finances. 
Contracts that enroll farmland where soil carbon 
is sequestered officially sell exchange soil offsets, so 
called because a landowner is being paid to sequester 
carbon in the soil, which is then used to offset an emis-
sion of carbon by some business or person seeking to 
reduce their carbon emissions.
When farmers sign contracts to provide XSOs, they 
agree to transfer to the aggregator the legal rights asso-
ciated with XSOs for the period of the contract (usually 
five years). The contracts offered by aggregators spec-
ify that enrolled projects are subject to the application 
eligibility rules of the Chicago Climate Exchange. 
Farmers can better evaluate the pros and cons of 
enrolling their land in XSO contracts by understanding 
the allocation of responsibility, reward and risk associ-
ated with the following contract specifications.
Eligible practices 
An XSO contract has what is called high task pro-
grammability. The contracts specify several production 
requirements for accruing XSOs. Basing payment on 
observable input activities is an efficient allocation of 
risk and value because trying to measure output in the 
form of actual sequestered carbon on all acres would 
be prohibitive. 
The major contract specification is that the land be 
farmed using “continuous conservation tillage.” The 
CCX Rulebook defines conservation tillage in the same 
way that the USDA Handbook of Conservation Prac-
tices does. Specific field activities, such as burning and 
harvesting residue, are prohibited. Likewise, the use of 
specific implements, such as plows and disks, are pro-
hibited. Restrictions vary depending on the region of 
the country enrolled. This guide does not give a com-
plete list of restrictions. Farmers considering a contract 
should read and understand all of the eligible prac-
tices for their particular region and soil types before 
signing.
The farmer is not required to prove, through soil 
testing, that the carbon was sequestered. Specific 
farming practices are assumed to sequester different 
amounts of carbon in different regions. There are two 
conservation tillage regions in Missouri (Figure 1). 
Conservation tillage in the Ozarks region is assumed 
to sequester 0.2 ton CO2 Eq. per year, while the remain-
der of the state is assumed to sequester 0.6 ton CO2 
Eq. per year. Continuous grass cover established on or 
after January 1, 1999, can also earn XSOs at the rate 
Figure 1. Missouri’s two conservation tillage regions have 
different carbon sequestration rates. 
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of 1 ton CO2 Eq. per year, regardless of the county in 
Missouri.
The contract specifies that “continuous cotton, 
soybeans and pulse crops (e.g., beans, peas, lintels) 
are eligible only if there is a cover crop.” This is par-
ticularly important for Missouri because many farm-
ers plant soybeans or cotton in consecutive years. One 
aggregator’s contract specifies that “enrolled acres 
may be planted in soybeans no more than 50 percent 
of the enrolled years.” 
The CCX rules specify that “no XSOs will be issued 
in years in which residue removal and/or burning 
occurs.” Alfalfa and grass hay harvest are permitted 
residue removal activities. Silage removal or Baling 
straw and removing silage are considered unauthor-
ized residue removal activities. Residue removal does 
not incur penalties and interest. The consequence of 
residue removal is only that no credit is earned in the 
year that the residue is removed. 
Allocation of responsibility
While the contract gives general requirements 
(e.g., conservation tillage) and prohibits specific prac-
tices (e.g., plowing), the farmer has the right to choose 
how to meet the requirements. Several different types 
of planting, fertilizer and pest control equipment can 
be used to meet the conservation tillage requirement. A 
variety of cropping systems are also permitted.
It is the responsibility of the farmer to periodically 
submit a project report that confirms compliance with 
the contract. Each year the aggregator sends participat-
ing farmers a form on which they indicate that all the 
contracted land is still compliant with the contract or 
that all or part of the land is out of compliance for some 
reason. 
It is the responsibility of aggregators to conduct a 
verification process on 10 percent of all acres they reg-
ister with the CCX. The contract specifies that the veri-
fication agency hired by the aggregator has the right to 
access enrolled acres to perform verification work. It 
is the responsibility of the owner to permit the verifier 
access to land and necessary documentation to com-
plete their job.
Allocation of risk
The attribution of a certain amount of carbon 
sequestration by following the performance require-
ments, rather than by actually measuring changes in 
soil carbon, reduces the risk to the farmer. The amount 
of XSO from each acre is known with certainty at the 
time the contract is signed. 
For a farmer, two major risks arise from the con-
tracts: (1) failure to comply and the resulting assess-
ment of penalties and fees and (2) inability to manage 
your farm to maximize profits because of production 
limitations. 
For noncompliance, the contracts specify that the 
owner of the noncompliant project shall replace the 
quantity of XSOs that are out of compliance. For exam-
ple, if 50 acres of a 400-acre contract are out of compli-
ance, the farmer is responsible for replacing all of the 
XSOs already earned, including those in the Carbon 
Reserve Pool (to be discussed later), on the 50 acres out 
of compliance. In addition, the farmer may be charged 
a 20 percent penalty, interest accruing on the XSO 
value, and costs incurred by the aggregator in enforc-
ing the contract. An example of contract incomplete-
ness in XSO contracts can be seen by the fact that none 
of the contracts consulted for this guide specify what 
rate of interest will be charged. This ambiguity could 
create problems if a farmer ceases to be in compliance. 
The risk associated with noncompliance varies 
with the market price for carbon credits. If the mar-
ket for carbon credits was lower when the farmer 
went out of compliance than previous sales made by 
the farmer, then replacing the credits would be rather 
easy. The farmer would simply purchase from the CCX 
the needed quantity of offsets. This purchase could, 
theoretically, cost less than the amount previously 
received for selling credits. However, if the market 
price increases, the cost of replacing the credits will be 
greater than the price that was previously received. In 
addition, the penalties and interest are still a potential 
cost of noncompliance.
Another risk is the potential loss of income from 
not being able to till the soil and from cropping sys-
tem limitations. The major production risk occurs 
when continuing conservation tillage reduces yield 
potential. This would most likely occur when compac-
tion exists and the contract specifications prohibit the 
farmer from using an implement that would break up 
the compaction. While many farmers have voluntarily 
used conservation tillage for years, they have always 
had the option of resorting to tillage to manage prob-
lems. A carbon sequestration contract removes some of 
the options for solving field problems.
Tilling to remedy compaction would make the land 
out of compliance. The farmer is faced with the deci-
sion of whether to take a continuing yield loss or repay 
contract payments with penalty and interest. When 
XSOs are priced low, it would take very few bushels of 
yield from tilling to justify breaking the contract. 
Specific cropping systems could be another source 
of risk for farmers in carbon contracts. The prohibi-
tion of continuous soybeans or cotton could reduce the 
options for crops produced given current and expected 
market conditions. Should a farmer decide to produce 
continuous cotton or soybeans, an additional cost of 
planting a cover crop would be incurred. At histori-
cal carbon credit prices, the cost of planting and sub-
sequently destroying a cover crop will be less than the 
income achieved from the carbon contract. However, 
assistance in paying for a cover crop may be available 
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from the USDA Environmental Quality Incentive Pro-
gram and could make compliance more profitable.
While probably foreseeable within a five-year con-
tract term, there is a risk of wanting to grow a new crop 
that does not conform to the contract rules. Whether or 
not that cropping system is compliant with the carbon 
sequestration contract is uncertain, thereby constitut-
ing a risk. For example, if a cellulosic ethanol market 
developed so that removing corn stover from the field 
was profitable, farmers with a carbon sequestration 
contract would find themselves losing earned carbon 
credits if they removed the stover.
Unauthorized removal of residue by burning or 
harvest results in no credits being issued on otherwise 
eligible cropland. The CCX Rulebook specifies that 
generally, two-thirds of the crop residue should remain 
on the field surface. While residue removal results in 
no credits being issued for the year the residue was 
removed, it does not require the repayment of previ-
ously earned credits, as tillage would. 
Rights to the exchange soil offsets
Farmers signing XSO contracts agree to “sell and 
deliver to the purchaser (aggregator) free from liens 
and encumbrances … the rights to the XSOs created 
during this contract.” Farmers who enter into soil car-
bon sequestration contracts agree to sell and deliver 
XSOs for an, as yet, unspecified price. 
Allocation of responsibility
Once a contract is initiated, the management of 
the XSOs becomes the exclusive responsibility of the 
aggregator. The supplying farmer has no responsi-
bility for managing or marketing the earned XSOs. 
All rights have been transferred, free from liens and 
encumbrances, to the aggregator. The CCX Rulebook 
indicates that the XSOs placed in the Carbon Reserve 
Pool (to be discussed later) remain the property of the 
farmer delivering the XSOs. 
Contractually, the CCX is not scheduled to 
accept XSOs for registration beyond 2010. If XSOs 
that would be registered in 2011 and beyond cannot 
be registered, the contract just ceases. The CCX does 
not have to recognize them as credits; the aggregator 
would not be responsible to manage them; the farmers 
would not have to comply with conservation tillage 
requirements. 
Allocation of reward
Fixing the amount of the XSO to compliance with 
a certain set of prescribed activities allows the farmer 
to provide the XSO with some degree of certainty 
and receive the reward of supplying them. The CCX, 
in determining the amount of XSOs to fix to different 
counties for different production practices, indicates 
that they were conservative in their estimate. Some 
farmers might consider this conservative estimate 
of the amount of carbon sequestered to reduce their 
reward for sequestering carbon.
Two things make the fixing of XSOs an efficient 
reward for farmers. First, if the XSOs were determined 
by actually measuring sequestered carbon, the cost of 
this measurement would reduce the net return from 
the transaction. Second, the simplification of the pro-
cess has allowed farmers to experiment with carbon 
sequestration. Were this simplification not present, 
they may not have the one market currently available. 
If the per-acre amount of XSO is too low, subsequent 
markets may develop to compete for the actual carbon 
sequestered. 
Allocation of risk
Financial risk to the farmer can occur in several 
ways. First, the farmer delivers the XSOs to the aggre-
gator for an unspecified price. The farmer is uncertain 
what price will be received for the XSOs at the time that 
he is modifying his management to create the XSOs.
The second risk, which has not occurred in the short 
history of marketing XSO, is that the aggregator would 
declare bankruptcy or cease to operate. The CCX Rule-
book states that the XSOs in the Carbon Reserve Pool 
remain the property of the farmer supplying the cred-
its, indicating that the farmer could continue to receive 
payments. The credits delivered to the aggregator but 
not yet sold and not in the Carbon Reserve Pool may 
be considered an asset of the aggregator and subject to 
claims by other creditors. No bonding of stored cred-
its exists for the trading of carbon credits as is seen 
in grain trading. Assuming that the farmer did have 
ownership rights to the XSOs he supplied, the verifica-
tion and other services offered by the aggregator can 
probably not be performed in an economically viable 
manner without the services of the aggregator. Fur-
thermore, marketing on the CCX requires registration 
so the farmer would likely have to find another regis-
tered aggregator to market his existing credits. Should 
the aggregator cease to manage the pool of XSO, the 
confusion relating to continuing the contract could be 
exhausting. 
Carbon Reserve Pool
Twenty percent of the offsets earned are put into 
the CCX Carbon Reserve Pool until the end of the 
contract. 
Allocation of responsibility
This reserve pool is mandated by the CCX. All XSO 
contracts sold on the CCX have the 20 percent reserve 
pool withheld from annual sales of carbon offsets. 
Contractually, the CCX is scheduled to release Carbon 
Reserve Pool XSOs in time to allow owners to trade 
before the end of 2010. If the CCX continues to accept 
XSOs for registration beyond 2010, the Carbon Reserve 
Pool XSOs not yet at the end of their five-year contract 
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are likely to be kept in the Carbon Reserve Pool until 
the contract ends.
When Carbon Reserve Pool XSOs are released, the 
aggregator determines when and for what price these 
credits will be sold. 
Allocation of reward
While the credits have been in the reserve pool, 
their value has not been earning money. No reward 
has been realized by the farmer, the aggregator or the 
exchange. On a theoretical level, there has been a loss 
of opportunity value. Depending on the price of carbon 
in the year that it is sold, this loss may be compensated 
by a higher price than would have been recognized if 
sold earlier. 
Allocation of risk
Farmers started enrolling acreage into carbon con-
tracts around 2005. Since that time, 20 percent of the 
credits have been earned but not marketed. This has 
effectively reduced the supply of offsets by 20 per-
cent each year — exerting upward pressure on the 
price of carbon credits. Beginning in 2010, these Car-
bon Reserve Pool credits will begin to be marketed. In 
essence, the temporary limit on supply will end and a 
new supply of stored XSO will enter the market, both 
exerting downward pressure on prices. Because off-
sets constitute a small percentage of carbon contracts 
traded, this pressure should be minor.
Should CCX actually stop trading carbon in 2010, 
the market price would probably be very low because 
the market is ceasing and the quantity of credits 
released into the market would be high.
In line with the economics of high asset specific-
ity, if in fact, there is no market for XSOs after 2010, 
the value of the Carbon Reserve Pool would approach 
zero. The XSOs have no value other than in the GHG 
market. Much uncertainty revolves around the use of 
early action credits should a mandatory greenhouse 
cap-and-trade system develop. An early action credit 
is the right to provide offsets from carbon-reducing 
activity (e.g., soil carbon sequestration) that occurs 
before the cap-and-trade rule actually takes effect. If 
agricultural early action credits are permitted, then 
the Carbon Reserve Pool will have increased value. 
A mandatory cap-and-trade system will increase the 
value of credits and the pool will have a supply to sell. 
If the market refuses to recognize agriculture’s early 
action credits, the value of XSOs in the pool would be 
diminished. 
Marketing and fees
All XSOs delivered to and sold by the aggrega-
tor are assessed an 8 to 10 percent service fee by the 
aggregator. In addition, the following costs are borne 
by the farmers: (1) the cost of registering the offsets on 
the CCX (15 cents per ton in 2009); (2) carbon credit 
trading fees assessed by the CCX when XSOs are sold 
(5 cents per ton in 2009); and (3) the cost of project veri-
fication (varies by year and by aggregator). These costs 
are deducted from the payment made to the farmer by 
the aggregator.
Allocation of responsibility
The sale of XSOs is the sole responsibility of the 
aggregator. They are able to sell or not sell XSOs 
depending on their analysis of the market. The con-
tracts usually do specify that they will sell the offsets 
within a certain time after the contract ends. Payments 
are scheduled to be made on an annual or semiannual 
basis.
Allocation of reward
The farmer receives the value of all XSOs sold, less 
the aggregator service fee and costs. Carbon market 
data can be found at the Chicago Climate Exchange 
Web site. 
Allocation of risk
Both farmer and aggregator face price risk in the 
carbon market – neither knows the price of carbon at 
the time the contract is initiated. They will receive dif-
ferent prices throughout the life of the contract. As of 
June 4, 2009, prices for XSOs have ranged from $.55/
metric ton of CO2 Eq. (July 2009) to $7.40/metric ton of 
CO2 Eq. (May 2008). 
The sales price, less fees, is allocated to the farmer. 
It is assumed that the sales price will always be greater 
than the fees. However, this is not necessarily the case. 
In some periods it may be that the price is insufficient 
to meet all of the costs of participating in the market. 
In late 2008, the price of carbon was so low that aggre-
gators made few or no sales, yet continued to incur 
verification expenses. While the farmer is responsible 
for the verification expense, the aggregator in 2008 
did not charge that fee. But eventually the verification 
expenses do need to be paid from whatever price can 
be obtained on the market. 
Land tenure changes
The carbon credit contract is tied to the land for 
five years, regardless of who controls the land. If the 
original farmer ceases to control the contracted acreage 
(either by sale of land or change of farming tenants) 
during the contracted period, a subcontract may be 
created. All of the terms and conditions of the original 
contract apply to the subcontract. 
Allocation of responsibility
Upon transferring control of the registered land, 
the original farmer is responsible for securing a sub-
contract and registering it with the aggregator. 
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Allocation of reward
Given that the carbon contract is expected to yield 
financial benefits to the farmer, the transfer of the land 
could have increased value associated with the con-
tract. However, because there currently is no barrier 
to the subsequent farmer entering into a contract on 
his own, it is doubtful that the new tenant will be will-
ing to pay the previous tenant anything for the exist-
ing contract. The constraints placed on the subsequent 
farmer could be considered a negative value and lower 
the price of the transfer.
Allocation of risk
If the control of the land does change, the original 
owner is responsible for getting a subcontract. If the 
original farmer fails to get the subsequent farmer to 
subcontract, or if the new farmer fails to meet the con-
tract specifications, the original farmer is responsible 
for the broken contract. A tenant signing a five-year car-
bon contract might want to secure control of the land 
by obtaining a five-year lease from the landowners. 
The contract can be written where the landowner 
gets the carbon payments. When this occurs, the land-
owner has incentive to keep the contract compliant 
should the tenant change. 
Tax rules
The payments received from selling carbon cred-
its are similar to those received when selling grain. No 
Internal Revenue Service Form 1099 will be sent to the 
farmer from the aggregator. The farmer is responsible 
for reporting the income to the IRS.
Further information on the Web
Chicago Climate Exchange
Home - chicagoclimateexchange.com
List of aggregators - chicagoclimateexchange.com/content.jsf?id=64
Rulebook for soil carbon offsets - http://chicagoclimateexchange.com/docs/offsets/
CCX_Conservation_Tillage_and_Grassland_Conversion_Protocol_Final.pdf 
Market data - chicagoclimateexchange.com/market/data/summary.jsf
USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service technical standards
www.nrcs.usda.gov/technical/standards/nhcp.html
Aggregators (contracts referenced in this publication)
AgraGate Climate Credits Corp. - agragate.com
North Dakota Farmers Union - carboncredit.ndfu.org
National Carbon Offset Coalition - ncoc.us
Kentucky Corn Growers’ Association - kycorn.org/ccx
Delta P2E2 Center - chicagoclimateexchange.com/offsets/projectReport.jsf
